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Abstract 
In the aftermath of the crisis, new instruments of economic governance have been adopted at 
the EU level. Until recently, these have been strongly dominated by what I assume to be the 
ECFIN coalition. However, at least since 2011, this coalition’s supremacy has been 
challenged by the competing coalition’s (EPSCO) willingness to rebalance the economic 
governance so that social concerns are better taken into account. Hence, drawing on the 
agenda-setting literature in the EU context, this working paper aims at retracing the process 
that has led to put this issue of the social dimension of the EMU on to the EU political 
agenda. Three hypotheses are made concerning the rise of this issue, the strategies employed 
by agenda-setters, and the policy subsystem of the economic governance. First, this study 
shows that the interest in this issue has been gradually fostered  ‘from below’, at the level of 
the European Parliament and the European Commission. Second, due to its ‘high politics’ 
nature, this issue could only be initiated ‘from above’ (European Council) and then expanded 
to lower levels of decision-making (Commission). Specifically, DG EMPL has managed to 
attract attention to this issue and to build its credibility in dealing with it by strategically 
framing the issue and directing it towards the EPSCO venue. Finally, I analyze the outcome of 
this agenda-setting process by assessing to what extent the two new social scoreboards which 
form part of this social dimension have been taken into account during the 2014 European 
semester. The result of this analysis is that the new economic governance has not been 
genuinely rebalanced insofar as its dominant policy core remains that of the ECFIN coalition.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Since the early days of European integration, the debate on whether the deepening of the 
Internal Market should go hand in hand with the development of a social dimension regularly 
stirs passions and creates division among scholars and decision-makers alike. With the 
Maastricht Treaty and the preparation of the single currency, the debate on the conciliation 
between the ‘social’ and the ‘economic’ tended to focus on the potential effects of a monetary 
union on national social protection systems. Three kinds of fears were generally associated 
with the development of a monetary union: the undermining of social spending as a result of a 
stronger fiscal discipline; the  “race-to-the bottom”  as regards labour market flexibility; and 
the use of social policy as a factor of adjustment in case of an asymmetric macroeconomic 
shock.1 
In the wake of the financial and sovereign debt crisis which has been affecting the 
European Union (EU) since late 2008, the discussion on the incomplete nature of the 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) has been reopened. In particular, the abovementioned 
fears have come again to the forefront in view of the new instruments of economic 
governance adopted to tackle the crisis. In chronological order, the ‘Lisbon Strategy’ has first 
been reformed and relabelled ‘Europe 2020’ in an effort to promote necessary structural 
reforms in the EU so as to achieve ‘smart, sustainable and inclusive growth’.2 Then, more 
crucially, the so-called ‘Six-pack’ entered into force on 13 December 2011. It consisted of a 
set of five Regulations and one Directive aiming at enhancing fiscal surveillance by 
strengthening the moribund Stability and Growth Pact, as well as macroeconomic surveillance 
under the new Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure (MIP). In addition, the ‘Six-pack’ laid 
the foundation for the new yearly monitoring cycle of the national economic and budgetary 
performances, namely the European semester. Finally, the Treaty on Stability, Coordination 
                                                          
1
  S. Fernandes and K. Maslauskaitene, “A Social Dimension for the EMU: Why and How?”, Notre Europe 
Jacques Delors Institute,  Policy Paper no. 98, September 2013, p. 3. 
2
  European Council, Conclusions 17 June 2010 Council, Brussels, 17 June 2010, p. 1.  
and Governance (TSCG) and the ‘Two-pack’, respectively, entered into force on 1 January 
2013 and on 30 May 2013, complementing this new architecture by further reinforcing fiscal 
surveillance in the EU and the eurozone in particular.  
According to some scholars, these instruments have to a large extent been determined 
by economic-oriented actors such as the European Central Bank (ECB), the Directorate 
General for the Economic and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN) and the ECOFIN Council.3 
Possibly due to their supposed shared conception of economic governance,4 social concerns 
have, at least until recently, been overlooked in favour of an ‘austerity-centred’ approach in 
the European semester. However, this approach has never achieved a consensus. A variety of 
political actors coming both from the European and national levels have been trying to 
reshape it, notably by integrating social considerations into the new economic governance. In 
this regard, the European Council of 13-14 December 2012 is illustrative of the alleged new 
emerging trend to deepen the social dimension of the EMU. This trend is also reflected in the 
European Commission (EC) Communication of 2 October 2013 entitled ‘Strengthening the 
social dimension of the EMU’. 5  At this stage, it is still not clear whether this recent 
development can be assimilated to a rebalancing of the economic governance by taking better 
account of social issues.  
                                                          
3
  C. de la Porte and E. Heins, “Game Change in EU Social Policy: From Optional Re-calibration to Coercive 
Retrenchment”, in E. Xiarchogiannopoulou and M. Rodrigues, (eds.), The Eurozone crisis and the 
transformation of democracy, London, Ashgate, 2013 (forthcoming).  
http://carolinedelaporte.files.wordpress.com/2013/08/intrusiveness-chapter_10june_final.pdf (last accessed 7 
May 2014); P. Pochet, “What’s wrong with EU2020?”, ETUI Policy Brief, no 2., Brussels, ETUI, 2010 ; P. 
Copeland & S. James, “Policy windows, ambiguity and Commission entrepreneurship: explaining the 
relaunch of the European Union’s economic reform agenda”, Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 21, no. 
1, 2014, pp. 1-19. 
4
  See M. Jepsen, “The modernization of Europe’s social agenda in a global perspective: ‘rebooting the social’, 
in A Europe of achievements in a changing world, Luxembourg, Office for Official Publications of the 
European Communities, 2009, pp. 71-84 and C. Barbier, “Ordolibéralisme et économie sociale de marché: la 
voie allemande de l’Europe?”, OSE Opinion Paper, no. 10, juillet 2012.  
5
  European Commission, Communication from the Commission: Strengthening the Social Dimension of the 
Economic and Monetary Union, COM (2013) 690 provisoire, Brussels, 2 October 2013.  
Therefore the following questions will guide us throughout this working paper: How 
did the issue of the strengthening of the social dimension of the EMU ended up on the EU 
political agenda? What path had this issue followed on its way to the EU political agenda? 
Which actors drove this agenda-setting process? Using which strategies? Has the new 
economic governance really been ‘socially’ rebalanced?  
Answering these questions is relevant on several accounts. For starters, in light of the 
social disasters experienced throughout the EU as a result of the austerity policies 
implemented since 2010, this potential rebalancing is worthy of analysis. Moreover, in the 
context of growing Euroscepticism, making economic governance more attuned to social 
problems may be essential to increase the public’s faith in the European project. As Jürgen 
Habermas has explained, the only remaining narrative capable of mobilizing the population is 
that of a Europe protecting the citizens’ ‘European way of life’ in the face of globalization.6 
Besides that, from a purely scientific point of view, looking into this subject is interesting for 
at least two reasons. First, it will shed light on the maturing process of the building of the new 
economic governance and on its recent developments, which have been little-studied to date. 
Second, this paper also tests the fairly recent agenda-setting approach developed by Princen in 
the EU context. It will identify some of its limitations and complement it thanks to other 
theoretical approaches, notably the ‘strategic framing’ approach developed by Mark Rhinard 
and the ‘advocacy coalition framework’ (ACF) built by Sabatier and his colleagues.  
Drawing on the abovementioned theoretical approaches, I will thus retrace the process 
that led to the agenda-setting of the social dimension of the EMU. Since ‘controlling agendas 
is about controlling participation’7 in the conflict, particular attention will be paid to the 
                                                          
6
  J. Habermas cited in F. Vandenbroucke, “Europe: The Social Challenge. Defining the Union’s social 
objective is a necessity rather than a luxury”, OSE Opinion Paper, no. 11, July 2012, p. 21.  
7
  S. Princen, “Agenda-setting strategies in EU policy processes”, Journal of EU Public Policy, vol. 18, no. 7, 
2011, p. 929. 
dynamics of conflict underlying this agenda-setting process. I assume that this process is 
driven by the opposition between two coalitions willing to translate their beliefs into the new 
economic governance and to acquire or maintain a seat at the decision-making table: on the 
one hand, the dominant ‘ECFIN’ coalition already in place and, on the other hand, the 
challenger ‘EPSCO’ coalition. In accordance with Princen’s theoretical model, I will assume 
that the ‘EPSCO’ coalition has faced two challenges to get a say in the European semester, 
namely gaining attention and building credibility. Furthermore, in addressing these challenges 
it is likely that this coalition has tried to affect two specific factors: policy frames and venues. 
However, despite the fact that the EPSCO coalition benefited from a window of opportunity 
to reshape the new economic governance, we will see that the rival coalition has managed to 
water down their proposal and to maintain their dominant position therein.  
The remainder of this working paper is organized as follows. The first section lays the 
theoretical foundations of my analysis. The second section begins by describing the initial 
domination of the European semester by the ECFIN coalition. After that, the first attempts by 
the challenger coalition to reshape the economic governance are examined in the context of 
the adoption of the ‘Six-pack’. Afterwards, I explain how a window of opportunity gradually 
opened in late 2012 under the impetus of the European Council and how the EPSCO coalition 
took advantage of that. Then, I elaborate on the negotiations within the EC around the 
communication of 2 October 2013 and explain how the EPSCO coalition’s proposal has been 
watered down by its adversaries. Finally, I briefly scrutinize to what extent the proposal to 
include two new social scoreboards to take better account of social issues in the economic 
governance has been followed by its actual rebalancing. 
 
 
1 Setting and shaping the EU political agenda: strategic framing, venue shopping and 
advocacy coalitions.  
1.1 Agendas and issues 
Drawing on Kingdon’s seminal work on this subject, one can define the ‘agenda’ as 
the list of issues to which people in a given polity are paying serious attention at any given 
time.8 The literature usually distinguishes between three different types of agendas, depending 
on who exactly is paying attention to the issue at stake: the decision-makers, the public or the 
media 9 However, because the EU decision-makers may be viewed as disconnected from 
public opinion and the media sphere,10 the most relevant type of agenda to be studied in this 
paper is the EU political agenda.  
As an agenda is generally constituted of different issues, we still need to explain what 
is meant by these ‘issues’. According to Cobb and Elder, an issue can be defined as a ‘conflict 
between two or more identifiable groups over procedural or substantive matters relating to the 
distribution of positions or resources’.11 The added-value of such a definition lies in the notion 
that what differentiates a simple topic from an issue is the battle between opposing political 
actors about how this topic should be definedand dealt with, and by whom. Consequently, this 
research will inevitably bring us to study the process of issue definition as well as the political 
turf war between the different actors involved. But before addressing this question, it is worth 
saying a few words about the career usually pursued by issues on their way to the political 
agenda 
 
                                                          
8
  J.W. Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies, New-York, Longman, 2011, updated 2
nd
 edn., p. 3. 
9
  S. Princen, “Agenda-Setting in the European Union: a theoretical exploration and agenda for research”, 
Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 14, no. 1, 2007, p. 29.  
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  L. Buonanno & N. Nugent, Policies and policy processes of the European Union, Basingstoke, Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2013, p. 104. 
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  R.W. Cobb & C.D. Elder, Participation in American Politics. The Dynamics of Agenda-Building, Baltimore, 
MD and London, John Hopkins University Press, 1972, p. 82.  
1.2 Issue careers  
A fruitful model explaining how issues arise and evolve was developed by Cobb et al. 
in 1976. These authors began by identifying four stages of an issue ‘career’: initiation, 
specification, expansion and entrance.12 Princen et al. have subsequently developed valuable 
theoretical tools based on this model. The latter suggest making a distinction between types of 
agenda processes in the EU according to the route taken by the issue to enter the agenda, 
either ‘from below’ or ‘from above’.13  The two routes are presumably governed by two 
different underlying logics (political and technocratic). A given issue takes the route ‘from 
below’ if it is placed on the agenda by experts working in Commission expert groups, Council 
Working Parties, by lobbyists, or even by Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) via 
their reports in the EP Committees.14 Conversely, it takes the alternate route ‘from above’ if it 
enters the agenda via the European Council. These considerations have consequences for the 
four stages of issue careers elaborated by Cobb et al..15 
To begin with, the way an issue is initiated will vary, depending on whether it comes 
from above or from below. In the European Council, placing an issue on the agenda is often 
linked to the saliency and the symbolic implications of a shared political problem; in an expert 
community, an issue arises more often as a result of professional concerns. During the second 
phase of the issue career, when a general issue is translated into a series of demands, the 
venue in which it is discussed will impact the framing of the problem. In the route from 
above, the European Council tends to roughly point out the guidelines regarding a specific 
issue. On the other hand, expert groups will be much more precise when drafting their 
                                                          
12
  R. Cobb, J-K. Ross and M.H. Ross, “Agenda Building as a Comparative Political Process”, The American 
Political Science Review, vol. 70, no. 1, March 1976, p. 127.  
13
  S. Princen & M. Rhinard, “Crashing and creeping: agenda-setting dynamics in the European Union”, Journal 
of European Public Policy, vol. 13, no. 7, 2006, p. 1121.  
14
  L. Buonanno & N. Nugent, op. cit., p. 103. 
15
  S. Princen & M. Rhinard, op. cit., pp. 1121-1123.  
proposals on a given issue. As I will further elaborate below, the way an issue has been 
framed will undoubtedly reflect the belief systems shared by political actors in certain venues. 
However, one should bear in mind that this model is an ideal-type. As Princen and 
Rhinard rightly point out, an issue may  start taking the route from above but then be left out 
in the cold and require lower level officials to take it up again. Furthermore, one could well 
imagine that the two routes may combine so that at a given stage of its career, an issue would 
take the route from above and at another the route from below. Besides that, Princen suggests 
that agenda-setters willing to move an issue on to the agenda always run the risk of facing 
what he calls vertical and horizontal ‘blockades’. Horizontal blockades occur when competing 
policymakers within the EU are able to keep an issue off the agenda, whereas the vertical 
blockade occurs when Member States themselves are reluctant to allow the EU level to get 
involved in a given issue.16 Briefly said, an issue career is most often anything but a long quiet 
river. These last remarks are at the very foundation of my first hypothesis: (H1) As a ‘high 
politics’ issue – meaning  that it is perceived as affecting national sovereignty –17 the  social 
dimension of the EMU has been initiated ‘from above’. It was then expanded to lower levels 
of decision-making  in order for it to be specified. Throughout its career, this issue has faced 
both horizontal and vertical ‘blockades’.  
In order to more fully explain how this issue has been specified and how it has been 
perhaps ‘hijacked’, we need to take a closer look now to the strategies used by political actors 
in the agenda-setting process as well as the interests that they pursue by influencing the 
political agenda.  
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  S. Princen, Agenda-Setting in the European Union, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2009, p. 16.  
17
  L. Buonanno & N. Nugent, op. cit., p. 103. 
1.3 Agenda-setting strategies 
A very insightful analysis of the strategies deployed by political actors to place issues on the 
EU political agenda has been elaborated by Princen.18 In his view, while seeking to move an 
issue on to the agenda, these actors are faced with two challenges: gaining attention and 
building credibility. Each challenge can be met using two different strategies. In order to gain 
attention, they need to mobilize potential supporters around their cause and arouse enough 
interest in it. To build their credibility, they have to demonstrate their sufficient capacity and 
convince of their authority in dealing with a given issue. In order to do so, agenda-setters can 
affect two factors: frames and venues. The following sections detail this model. Policy 
frames, interest and authority 
In his book on the policy shaping strategies of the Commission, Mark Rhinard 
provides a subtle analysis of policy frames as well as of their strategic use by political actors. 
He defines a ‘policy frame’ as ‘an interpretative construction of a policy problem that offers a 
rationale for change while also proscribing a course of action and particular solution’. 19 
Generally speaking, the scientific literature accounts for three functions of a policy frame. 
First of all, it provides us with a formulation of the problem which explains what is at stake 
and how the problem should be diagnosed. Second, it suggests a solution to the defined 
problem by identifying possible routes of action to tackle it. Finally, a policy frame offers a 
normative reason which justifies these actions. That being said, Rhinard argues that officials 
from the Commission can strategically mobilize these policy frames to promote policy 
change, especially by manipulating the institutions and by creating coalitions. Drawing on 
earlier studies on the subject, Rhinard argues that three criteria have to be met for a policy 
frame to be effective: it has to be sufficiently vague to allow mobilizing a wide array of 
                                                          
18
  S. Princen, “Agenda-setting strategies in EU policy processes”, Journal of EU Public Policy, vol. 18, no. 7, 
2011, pp. 927-943. 
19
  M. Rhinard, Framing Europe: the policy shaping strategies of the European Commission, Dordrecht, 
Republic of Letters, 2010, p. 37.  
actors; it should not bring about a too radical institutional shift; and it should be in line with 
commonly accepted popular values.20  
In addition, Copeland and James have shown that the framing success of Europe 2020 
by DG ECFIN was largely due to the fact that they had provided a policy frame that perfectly 
suited the Member States’ positions in the Council.21 For Princen, this framing process is 
especially relevant insofar as it raises interest in a certain issue. In other words, some officials 
from within the Commission can be thought of as ‘frame entrepreneurs’.22 Princen contends 
that frame entrepreneurs can arouse interest for a specific question in two ways: through ‘big 
words’ and through ‘small steps’.23 The first strategy involves linking the issue at stake with 
overarching values deemed to be central to the EU’s identity or with policy commitments. 
Framing through small steps consists of highlighting certain less politicized aspects of an 
issue and progressively attracting support for policies. However, raising interest is not enough 
for an issue to come on to the agenda. Princen indeed argues that an effective policy frame in 
the EU context also needs to convince competing policy makers and Member States 
governments of the legitimacy of the EU involvement with respect to this issue (‘claiming 
authority’). 24 This effort of persuasion may be particularly tricky with respect to issues such 
as the one studied in this paper. Strengthening the social dimension of the EMU means that 
the EU should care about social issues, which is not self-evident at all. Policy actors willing to 
develop such a social dimension would therefore need to present strong arguments in favor of 
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  M. Rhinard, op. cit., p. 42.  
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  P. Copeland & S. James, op. cit., p.  
22
  It is important to underline that owing to the internal coordination structure of the Commission, some DGs 
hold structural advantages over others as regards policy framing. This is especially the case for the lead DG 
who is holding the pen for the first legislative draft. See M. Hartlapp, J. Metz & C. Rauh, “Linking Agenda-
Setting to Coordination Structures: Bureaucratic Politics inside the European Commission”, Journal of 
European Integration, vol. 35, no. 4, p. 431. 
23
  S. Princen, “Agenda-setting strategies in EU policy processes”, Journal of EU Public Policy, vol. 18, no. 7, 
2011, p. 933.  
24
  S. Princen, op. cit., pp. 936-938. 
this EU intervention, not least a legal basis and arguments circumventing the subsidiarity 
issue.  
In Princen’s perspective, claiming authority can be achieved by framing the issue in 
two broad ways. First, one could link an issue to established policies either by arguing that 
this issue falls under the remit of the EU or by demonstrating that these policies have an 
impact on the issue. Second, agenda-setters may also identify ‘common challenges’ for the 
whole EU which could only be properly tackled at the EU level. In sum, several strategies can 
be used by prospective agenda-setters in order to arouse interest in the issue they care about 
and to claim their authority to deal with it. Depending on certain factors outlined in this 
subsection, a frame entrepreneur will be more or less successful in its effort to influence the 
career of an issue. As ‘what is being talked about depends on who is doing the talking’25, we 
still need to discuss how this framing process relates to the second factor likely to be affected 
by agenda-setters, namely the institutional venues.  
Venue-shopping, coalitions and capacity-building 
The venue-shopping literature is built on the premise that political actors ‘try to alter 
the roster of participants who are involved in the issue by seeking out the most favourable 
venue for the consideration of their issues’.26 In this theory, policy change can occur as a 
result of a shift of the institutional decision-making arenas – the venues – concerned with a 
particular issue. Emphasizing the notion that ‘controlling agendas is about controlling 
participation’,27 this perspective highlights the fact that strategic political actors will try to 
involve those actors in the decision-making process who share the same interests and the 
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  S. Princen, Agenda-Setting in the European Union, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2009, p. 10.  
26
  F. Baumgartner & B. Jones, “Agenda Dynamics and Policy Subsystems”, The Journal of Politics, vol. 53, no. 
4, 1991, p. 1045.  
27
  S. Princen, “Agenda-setting strategies in EU policy processes”, Journal of EU Public Policy, vol. 18, no. 7, 
2011, p. 929.  
same values while excluding the others. In Princen’s words, policy entrepreneurs will seek to 
‘mobilize their supporters’ by directing the issue in the right venue.  
As Princen rightly puts it, venues differ in their receptiveness, depending on the task 
they are supposed to carry out, their authority to deal with certain issues, and their 
composition.28 Moreover, as Rhinard puts forward, the Commission’s DGs are ‘stovepiped’, 
meaning that each DG has a different organizational culture, seeks to keep its policy 
prerogatives and conflict with others for the ownership of resources.29 This analysis is also 
backed up by Manuel Szapiro when he states that ‘each DG has its own predominant 
ideology, loyalties, language(s), structure, working style/methods/culture, etc.’.30 To further 
elaborate this point, one could draw from the ‘advocacy coalition framework’ to think of the 
Eurozone economic governance as a ‘policy subsystem’ in which participants would be 
aggregated in two ‘advocacy coalitions’ (ECFIN and EPSCO) that share similar policy core 
beliefs.31 Bearing this assumption in mind,32 one might expect the different coalitions involved 
in the new economic governance of the EMU to develop their own policy frames and to try to 
translate them into the EMU governance. Turning back to the question of the mobilization of 
supporters, it is likely that frame entrepreneurs will frame an issue in a way that taps into the 
belief system of advocacy coalitions so as to build support for their stand. 33  Moreover, 
hypotheses made by Sabatier et al. concerning policy change seem particularly relevant for 
this research. In their view, the policy core of a governmental program would remain the same 
unless the advocacy coalition that instituted it loses its supremacy. For this to happen there 
needs to be significant perturbations external to the subsystem which alter the distribution of 
political resources or the views of coalitions within the subsystem.  
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  Ibid., pp. 10-11.  
29
  M. Rhinard, op. cit., p. 25.  
30
  M. Szapiro, The European Commission: a practical guide, London, John Harper, 2013, p. 77.  
31
  P.A. Sabatier & C.M. Weible, “The Advocacy Coalition Framework. Innovations and clarifications”, in P.A. 
Sabatier (ed.), Theories of the Policy Process, Boulder, Westview Press, 2007, p. 196.  
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  In view of space limitations, this assumption will not be tested in this working paper.   
33
  M. Rhinard, op. cit., p. 43.  
However, if an issue is to be directed to another venue, policy entrepreneurs will also 
need to convince others that the venue involved is sufficiently equipped to deal with that 
issue.34 Within the EU, capacity-building efforts may take the form of an enhancement of the 
technical expertise or of an increase in manpower or financial resources. 35 Regarding social 
policy at EU level, Wendon has demonstrated that the Commission, and especially DG V,36 
had actively sought out to build up new arrangements such as the Social and the Civic 
Dialogue in order to circumvent the Member States’ influence.37 In the field of social and 
employment policy, such networks already exist which have been built up in the context of 
the Lisbon Strategy and the ‘Open Method of Coordination’. National experts regularly meet 
in different committees to exchange best practices via peer review mechanisms. Assuming 
that these networks of experts belong to the EPSCO coalition, one could thus expect them to 
be strategically used by the Commission to assist its own expertise. Two hypotheses may thus 
be built with regard to the strategies usually employed by agenda-setters as well as the actual 
outcome of this agenda-setting process.    
(H2) Agenda-setters have strategically framed the issue in order to arouse interest and claim 
authority, and directed it towards their coalition’s venue so as to mobilize their supporters and 
convince of their capacity to deal with it.  
(H3) The policy core of the new economic governance of the EMU has changed as a result of 
the agenda-setting process of this issue. 
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  S. Princen, “Agenda-setting strategies in EU policy processes”, Journal of EU Public Policy, vol. 18, no. 7, 
2011, p. 930.  
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  B. Wendon, “The Commission as image-venue entrepreneur in EU social policy”, Journal of EU Public 
Policy, vol. 5, no. 2, 1998, p. 343. 
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  DG V is the former name of the DG EMPL.  
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  B. Wendon, Ibidem. 
Table 1 Summary of the hypotheses 
Issue career (H1) As a ‘high politics’ issue, the social dimension of the EMU has 
been initiated ‘from above’. It was then expanded to lower levels of 
decision-making. Throughout its career, this issue has faced both vertical 
and horizontal ‘blockades’.  
Agenda-setting 
strategies 
(H2) Agenda-setters have strategically framed this issue in order to 
arouse interest and claim authority and directed it towards their 
coalition’s venue so as to mobilize their supporters and convince of their 
capacity to deal with it.  
Agenda-setting 
outcome 
(H3) The policy core of the new economic governance of the EMU has 
changed as a result of the agenda-setting process of this issue.  
 
In the next section these hypotheses will be tested by retracing the whole agenda-setting 
process of the issue of the social dimension of the EMU from the negotiations around the 
‘Six-pack’ until recently.  
 
2 Pushing the agenda for a social EMU: a missed opportunity? 
In this second section, I shall retrace the agenda-setting process of the strengthening of the 
social dimension of the EMU from the beginning of the negotiations around the ‘Six-pack’ in 
early 2011 to the present. I shall test the hypotheses elaborated above by drawing on official 
documents as well as on interviews carried out with key EU and national officials. 
2.1 The initial takeover of the European semester by the ECFIN coalition 
There is little doubt that the new economic governance has been essentially 
determined by the economic and financial actors at the EU level (DG ECFIN, ECOFIN 
Council, Economic Policy Committee, Economic and Financial Committee).38 This takeover 
raises questions insofar as these actors presumably share the same beliefs about the economic 
governance. For some scholars, these beliefs would be strongly pervaded with ‘ordoliberal’ 
                                                          
38
  P. Pochet, “What’s wrong with EU2020?”, ETUI Policy Brief, no 2., Brussels, ETUI, 2010.; C. de la Porte & 
E. Heins, op. cit. 
principles39 and would tend to understand social policies solely through the lens of growth and 
competitiveness.40 For instance, in the areas of pensions, labour market organisation or labour 
law, ‘country-specific recommendations’ (CSRs) issued at the end of the European semester  
consistently point out the necessary match between life expectancy and pensionable age and 
call for active labour market policies as well as labour market deregulation.41 This observation 
is in line with our assumption of a ‘stovepiped’ Commission made up of DGs with different 
cultures and ideologies that tend to translate their beliefs into policies. It is also consistent 
with the argument raised above concerning strategic framing. Copeland and James have 
indeed very clearly demonstrated that Europe 2020 had been strategically framed by DG 
ECFIN as the ‘way out of the crisis’ in order to remain the key player in the policy subsystem.  
On the one hand, this policy venue was ‘ontologically’ receptive to the economic crisis 
because it had the authority to deal with economic and financial affairs and because it is 
mainly composed of economists who care about such issues. On the other hand, DG ECFIN 
has framed Europe 2020 in such a manner that the reduction of public deficits was presented 
as the overarching goal of the strategy.42 One may think that this was all done in order to keep 
their privileged position in the European semester and to increase both their financial and 
bureaucratic resources. The same can actually been said for the whole set of instruments of 
the new economic governance. Different interviewees, who one might assume to belong to the 
EPSCO coalition, indeed share the view that they have been totally excluded from the 
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discussions on the new EMU governance in favor of the ECFIN coalition. These latter 
discussions were, in all likelihood, restricted to very confidential arenas. 43 
However, far from being cast in stone, the European semester should be considered 
more as a slowly maturing object that leaves room for evolution. For example, Vanhercke has 
demonstrated that greater account has gradually been taken of the social and employment 
issues during the semester. 44  Before confirming this observation, the next sections will 
explain how social and employment actors have tried to respond to the initial takeover of the 
economic governance by the economic and financial actors. 
2.2 The humble beginnings of a social EMU 
Although the first developments of the new economic governance were to a greater 
extent driven by economic and financial actors at both Council and Commission level, social 
and employment actors have not been silent. Interestingly, a member of the Social Protection 
Committee (SPC) pointed out the fact that the SPC and the Employment Committee (EMCO), 
which in his own words form part of the EPSCO coalition, have been trying to get a say in the 
European semester by using their own instruments as a kind of “Trojan horse”.45  
However, one major problem faced by these actors in their ambition to re-socialize the 
semester was the issue of the legal basis. If we go back to Princen’s theory, this issue directly 
refers to the strategy of ‘claiming authority’. As already mentioned above, policy actors 
willing to strengthen the social dimension of the EMU will have to convince their opponents 
of the legitimacy of an EU intervention in this field, which is far from straightforward. This 
can be done, as suggested by Princen, in two ways: either by framing the issue in such a way 
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that it falls under the field of competencies of the EU, or by identifying common challenges 
faced by the whole EU that would require a common response. Crucially, as regards the new 
economic governance and especially its ‘backbone’, the ‘Six-pack’, one could say that its 
legal basis has been indirectly extended to the Title IX (Employment) of the Treaty on the 
functioning of the EU (TFEU) thanks to the work of Pervenche Bérès, a French MEP from the 
S&D group and chairwoman of the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs (EMPL). 
In her opinion reports on three of the five regulations included in the ‘Six-pack’,46 Pervenche 
Bérès tried to extend the legal basis of these instruments to Article 148 TFEU which deals 
with the coordination of employment policies. Even if this maximalist position 47  did not 
eventually pass, she nevertheless managed to include several amendments to the Commission 
proposal that directly referred to Article 148 TFEU, as illustrated by Article 2-a, paragraph 2, 
alinea (b) of the Regulation 1175/2011 and the recital 16 of the Regulation 1176/2011: 
“2. The European semester shall include: [...] (b) the formulation, and the 
examination of the implementation, of the employment guidelines that must be 
taken into account by Member States in accordance with Article 148(2) TFEU 
(employment guidelines).”48 
“(16) [...] The in-depth review should take into account, where appropriate, 
Council recommendations or invitations addressed to Member States under 
review in accordance with Articles 121, 126, and 148 TFEU [...].”49 
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In justifying this de facto extension of the legal basis of the ‘Six-pack’, Bérès invoked the 
increasing divergences and social imbalances between Member States and the need to address 
this issue at the EU level.50 In other words, it seems that Bérès has strategically framed the 
issue by identifying social imbalances as a challenge faced by the whole EU, thereby 
justifying an intervention at EU level. In so doing, she tried to put employment and social 
issues to the fore. In her view, the new governance is not just about the surveillance of 
budgetary policies and macroeconomic imbalances but is also concerned with job creation 
and employment coordination. It is also worth pointing out the fact that Bérès linked her 
proposal to the overarching goal of meeting the Europe 2020 targets, which can be compared 
to what Princen called a strategy for arousing interest through ‘big words’. Finally, as 
underlined by Bérès, including a reference to Article 148 also means opening the door for a 
greater involvement of social and employment actors, namely the SPC and the EMCO, in the 
European semester.51 In accordance with Princen’s theory, we could then consider that this 
indirect extension of the semester to the Title IX of the TFEU also served as a means to 
mobilize potential supporters by directing the issue towards the ‘EPSCO’ venue. 
However, as stressed by a member of the cabinet of the European Commissioner for 
Employment and Social Affairs, this first entry of employment and social issues in the 
European semester through the back door has widely gone unnoticed and has not dispelled all 
the doubts about the EU involvement in such an area.52 This observation may be seen as 
confirming the first part of my first hypothesis, according to which the ‘high politics’ nature 
of this issue prevents low-level decision-makers such as MEPs from drawing the attention of 
higher-level policy-makers to it. In fact, it was not until late 2012 that the idea of developing a 
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genuine social dimension for the EMU was truly evoked at the highest political level. With 
the discussion around the ‘Two-pack’ and on possible reinforced sanctions, the debate indeed 
has started to focus on the particular situation of the EMU compared to that of the EU-27. 
Two reasons may explain this shift of focus towards the EMU. First, the legal basis to impose 
sanctions provided for in the ‘Two-pack’ is different for EMU countries and for non-
Eurozone countries. Second, the fear of a “Grexit”, the withdrawal of Greece from the 
eurozone, has intensely motivated European decision-makers to address the specific issue of 
the eurozone.53 Consequently, a broad discussion followed in the three institutions on the 
possible ways of enhancing the EMU integration. As part of this discussion emerged the issue 
of a strengthened social dimension for the EMU. The European Commissioner for 
Employment and Social Affairs already delivered a speech at the meeting of the College of 
Commissioners in June 2012 calling upon the development of a social dimension besides the 
already existing budgetary and economic dimensions. However, within the Commission, 
nothing special came out of this speech.54 In fact, at this stage the Presidency of the European 
Council associated to the ECB and the Presidency of the Commission were only thinking to 
broadly outline the major strands of the specific governance framework for the EMU. On 26 
June 2012, the Presidency of the European Council released a report entitled ‘Towards a 
genuine economic and monetary union’ which said very little about a potential social 
dimension.55 In this report, Herman Van Rompuy committed to develop, in collaboration with 
the Presidents of the Commission, the ECB and the Eurogroup, a more precise roadmap for 
the achievement of a genuine EMU by the end of the year 2012. 
Interestingly, the day of publication of this latter report, high level meetings were 
arranged between the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) and the four Presidents 
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in order for the trade unions to present their ‘Social Compact for Europe’.56 These meetings 
were the opportunity for trade unions to provide input for discussions on the completion of the 
EMU that were due to take place at June European Council. However, when comparing the 
content of this “Social Compact” to the conclusions of the June European Council, one cannot 
but notice that the idea of giving equal footing to the social dimension and the economic and 
fiscal governance was supposedly not yet shared by the Heads of State and Government. Of 
course, social concerns are not totally absent from these conclusions. But still, the ‘recipes’ 
put forward by the European Council and the ETUC to tackle the crisis are diametrically 
opposed. 
However, trade unions are not the only actors trying to move the social dimension of 
the EMU on to the agenda. On 20 November 2012, the European Parliament indeed published 
a resolution including recommendations on the abovementioned report of the European 
Council.57 In this resolution, social issues are highlighted on several occasions. There are 
several references to the ‘European social model’ and the overarching goal of the EU and its 
Member States to ensure social inclusion and a high level of employment as laid down in 
Articles 9 TFEU (the so-called ‘horizontal social clause’), 151 TFEU and 153 TFEU. Turning 
to the specific recommendations included in this resolution, the European Parliament calls for: 
an improvement of the European semester by developing EU instruments for social protection 
and minimum standards; a greater synergy between budgetary surveillance and Europe 2020 
targets; and the establishment of a ‘social pact’ for Europe aimed at balancing fiscal and 
macroeconomic benchmarks with employment and social benchmarks. Once again, it seems 
that the European Parliament made heavy use of ‘big words’ in this report, namely by 
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repeatedly referring to the ‘European social model’, to core values of the EU project or to 
specific commitments such as the Europe 2020 targets. This assertion is once again in line 
with Princen’s theory according to which the purpose of such a strategy is to arouse interest in 
a given issue. One could also contend that this strategy would aim to convince the EU 
authorities to deal with such an issue.  
Ten days later, it was the Commission’s turn to present its own vision on the future of 
the EMU through the issuance of its communication entitled ‘A blueprint for a deep and 
genuine economic and monetary union. Launching a European Debate’.58 From the point of 
view of the rebalancing of the European semester, this communication clearly appears less 
ambitious than the European Parliament’s resolution. Social issues are somewhat overlooked 
and the discussion focuses to a greater extent on the development of necessary stabilization 
mechanisms for the eurozone, such as a true fiscal capacity to address asymmetric shocks, and 
on ideas of contractual arrangements between the Member States and the Commission. 
However, the blueprint hints the necessary reinforcement of the coordination and the 
surveillance of employment and social policies and, perhaps more importantly, refers to the 
unemployment benefit scheme in the United States. 59  According to my interviewee, the 
inclusion of these two elements was essentially driven by DG EMPL and was at that time 
qualified as revolutionary.60  
In other words, at this moment, the strengthening of the social dimension of the EMU 
was still not a very prominent issue on the EU political agenda. Despite the many appeals 
made by the European Parliament, the trade unions and to a lesser extent the European 
Commissioner for Employment and Social Affairs, the prospect of developing it was still 
rather weak. Briefly said, neither Pervenche Bérès nor the ETUC have succeeded in genuinely 
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initiating the issue of the social dimension of the EMU. All in all, all these appeals appear to 
have faced both horizontal and vertical blockades, thus providing some evidence for the last 
part of my first hypothesis.  
2.3 The counter-attack of the social and employment actors  
The triggering event for the development of a social dimension for the EMU was the 
European Council on 13-14 December 2012. In line with the ongoing work done by all three 
institutions, Heads of State and Government were due to discuss the completion of the EMU. 
Quite surprisingly, in the conclusions of the European Council, the President of the European 
Council and the President of the Commission pledged themselves to prepare measures for the 
June 2013 European Council, amongst which measures concerning the ‘social dimension of 
the EMU, including social dialogue’.61 This commitment is all the more striking that the draft 
conclusions of this same Council made no mention whatsoever of the social dimension of the 
EMU.62 Unfortunately, I do not have access to insider information that could explain this 
attitudinal change on the part of Member States as regards the social dimension of the EMU. 
Nevertheless, one might probably consider that this new element in the conclusions was partly 
the result of bilateral negotiations between France and Germany conducted in parallel of the 
European summit.63 Other interviewees also pointed out the political legitimation objective 
pursued by high-level policy-makers as well as their willingness to reassure the public that 
‘the building of Europe was not only aimed at imposing budgetary rules but was also a matter 
of social justice’. 64 However, at first sight, the impact of such a reference to the social 
dimension in the conclusions of the European Council should not be overestimated. It has 
certainly helped to move this issue on to the EU political agenda, but it nonetheless did not 
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prevent it from being watered down or hidden away afterwards. Many people indeed 
downplayed the importance of this sentence after the Council.65 
It is worth stressing at this stage that without such an impetus from the European 
Council, the next developments of the social dimension of the EMU would not likely have 
been imaginable. As already mentioned, this issue, by taking the road ‘from below’ (that is to 
say, the one which passed through the EP, the EC and some stakeholders), appears to have 
faced vertical and horizontal blockades. Consequently, in confirmation of my first hypothesis, 
it definitely seems that the only institution able to initiate this issue was the European 
Council. In accordance with Princen et al., 66  one could argue that initiating this issue 
amounted for the European Council to a symbolic commitment.  
This commitment, however, required further specification from lower-level political 
actors, namely at the Commission level. In order to test the second hypothesis, I shall now 
explain how this specification process has been characterized by a turf battle between the 
EPSCO and ECFIN coalitions and how these actors made use of the strategies depicted by 
Princen et al. 
Following the December European Council, European Commission President Barroso 
asked László Andor to give substance to the abovementioned high-level commitment by 
preparing a Communication on the social dimension of the EMU. DG EMPL thus took the 
lead in the policy-shaping phase by holding the pen. According to Hartlapp et al., one may 
thus argue that DG EMPL had a structural advantage over its adversaries with respect to 
policy framing.67 Moreover, this advantage was supplemented with the powerful support on 
the one hand, of Herman Van Rompuy, who came at the EPSCO Council of March to meet 
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László Andor and the EU Ministers of employment and social affairs during a lunch 
organized prior to the session, and, on the other hand, of the Irish Presidency of the EU.68 This 
joint involvement of DG EMPL, the EPSCO ministers, the Presidency of the Council and the 
Presidency of the EU created momentum for the development of the social dimension of the 
EMU. On the one hand, this undoubtedly helped DG EMPL to strengthen its position within 
the European Commission by reinforcing its credibility and, on the other hand, this helped to 
bring shared ideas about the social dimension out of the initial “primeval soup” of ideas69 and 
to arouse the interest of many key EU decision-makers, at least the EU Ministers of 
employment and social affairs. 
The early days of the policy-shaping phase seem thus to have been characterized by 
the framing attempts of what might be now called the EPSCO coalition (DG EMPL and 
EPSCO Council) supported by Herman Van Rompuy and the Irish Presidency. Afterwards, it 
was the Commission’s role to more fully develop the substance of the social dimension of the 
EMU. The Communication on the social dimension of the EMU was initially meant to be 
published by late May 2013. However, during the internal drafting process, things were 
further complicated by the strong opposition from DG ECFIN and by the specific context of 
the moment, especially the German federal elections due to take place on 22 September.70 The 
release of the Communication was thus postponed to October 2013.  
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2.4 A communication to strengthen the social dimension: two steps forward, one step 
backward? 
The Communication of the Commission entitled ‘Strengthening the social dimension 
of the Economic and Monetary Union’ was published on 2 October 2013.71 According to this 
Communication, the social dimension of the EMU refers to:  
‘[...] the ability of economic governance mechanisms and policy instruments to 
identify, take into account and address problematic developments and 
challenges related to employment and social policies in the EMU.’72 
 
This Communication revolves around three main axes, namely (1) the reinforcement 
of the surveillance and of the coordination of employment and social challenges/policies; (2) 
the improvement of solidarity mechanisms and labour mobility; and (3) the strengthening of 
the social dialogue. Of these three axes, the first one is the most developed and has attracted 
the most attention. I shall therefore focus more particularly on the initiatives aimed at better 
monitoring of social and employment challenges and improving policy coordination in the 
EMU.  
The flagship initiative proposed by the Commission with respect to this first line of 
action has been to create two additional scoreboards of social and employment indicators to 
be respectively included in the Joint Employment Report (JER) and in the Macroeconomic 
Imbalance Procedure (MIP). As the President of the Employment Committee put it, the idea 
to set up a new scoreboard was furthermore one of the only points of agreement in the EPSCO 
Council.73 This observation is consistent with what Copeland and James have demonstrated, 
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namely that for a policy frame to be effective, it has to be in line with the Member States’ 
positions. One could also argue that, in accordance with Rhinard’s perspective on framing 
success, building a scoreboard remains a vague proposal and does not bring a too radical 
institutional shift, which can explain its support from the EPSCO Council and, afterwards, 
from the European Council. Furthermore, suggesting the creation of a scoreboard could well 
be assimilated to what Princen called a framing strategy through “small steps” insofar as such 
an allegedly technocratic instrument will be perceived as a non-contentious matter, therefore 
allowing for a gradual interest to be raised.  
The first scoreboard includes the five following headline indicators: unemployment 
level and changes; “NEET” rate (young people not in education, employment or training) and 
youth unemployment rate; real gross disposable income of households; at-risk-of-poverty rate 
of working age population; and inequalities (S80/S20 ratio). The second scoreboard consists 
of the following four auxiliary74 indicators: participation rate, long-term unemployment ratio, 
youth unemployment rate (complemented by the proportion of NEET), and the ‘at-risk-of-
poverty and social exclusion’ rate. Interestingly, while the first scoreboard of headline 
indicators included in the JER was the initiative of DG EMPL, establishing another social 
scoreboard to be included in the MIP was DG ECFIN’s will. This is because the JER is the 
responsibility of DG EMPL (in collaboration with EPSCO actors) whereas the MIP remains 
totally in the hands of DG ECFIN. Each actor therefore wanted to keep the control of what 
could be said about social and employment issues during the European semester. 75 
Furthermore, since the MIP and its scoreboard of macroeconomic indicators are based on 
more solid legal foundations (through the ‘Six-pack’) than the JER (which is part of Europe 
2020 strategy), DG EMPL did not want to ‘offer’ its social scoreboard to DG ECFIN in the 
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MIP framework for fear that it might ultimately be hijacked and called into question on legal 
grounds. 
These observations partly confirm my second hypothesis according to which agenda-
setters try to direct the issue towards their coalition’s venue. In the debate on the social 
scoreboard, a proposal made by DG EMPL was particularly sensitive and gave rise to tough 
confrontations with the Cabinet of Commissioner Rehn, namely the proposal to establish 
thresholds in order to better monitor the excessive social slippages in the Member States. In 
DG EMPL’s view, if a Member State would have reached values above the threshold defined 
for an indicator, it could automatically have led to recommendations from the Commission to 
correct this problem. Two broad reasons may explain the fierce opposition from DG ECFIN 
as regards this question. First, thresholds considerably improve the readability of the 
scoreboard, which is no longer restricted to experts but can be easily interpreted by anyone. 
Everyone would therefore have been able to appreciate the disastrous social and employment 
situation in the Member States and to draw conclusions on how the crisis has been tackled by 
DG ECFIN since its onset. Second, inserting thresholds in the social scoreboard would have 
meant a clear weakening of DG ECFIN’s own scoreboard of macroeconomic indicators. Both 
scoreboards would have been put on an equal footing, which could have required difficult 
arbitration at some point.76 
Moreover, in the Council, only a small minority of Member States (among others, 
Belgium, France, Austria, Italy and Luxembourg) supported the inclusion of thresholds in the 
social scoreboard. There were indeed concerns in some Member States that such a scoreboard 
with thresholds could trigger new sanctions and that their wrists would eventually be slapped 
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again by Brussels.77 Turning back to my theoretical framework, one may therefore argue that 
the attempts from the ‘EPSCO coalition’ to direct the issue of the social dimension towards 
their venue were only partly successful. On the one hand, they managed to retain control over, 
and responsibility for, the social scoreboard included in the JER. But on the other hand, their 
adversaries in DG ECFIN have succeeded in developing their own instrument related to the 
social dimension and in offsetting their small loss of power by watering down the EPSCO 
coalition’s proposal. This ‘horizontal blockade’ at the level of the Commission was also 
accompanied by a ‘vertical blockade’ on the part of some Member States that, although 
accepting the idea of a social scoreboard, did not want to establish thresholds for its 
indicators. However, even though the DG EMPL’s proposal was eventually weakened, there 
is no doubt that it succeeded in making this issue ultimately enter the EU decision agenda. Its 
proposal was indeed quickly endorsed at the December EPSCO and European Councils. 
Furthermore, if the success of the EPSCO coalition’s venue-shopping strategy is to be 
assessed in light of its potential to mobilize supporters, this strategy seems to have borne fruit, 
albeit imperfectly. DG EMPL has succeeded in rallying a vast array of actors around its 
project of developing a social scoreboard in the European semester so as to keep a closer eye 
on social and employment developments in the EU. Assisted by the support of the Presidency 
of the European Council and of the EU, DG EMPL has managed to mobilize the whole 
EPSCO Council, including both the EMCO and the SPC. In some way, one may consider that 
DG EMPL has actually used both committees in order to facilitate the adoption of the 
scoreboard by the Member States at the December Council. A kind of ‘informal’ meeting 
between the Commission and the two committees had actually been scheduled in September 
2013 in Lithuania, at which the Commission had already introduced its indicators for the 
social scoreboard.78 This surely may help explain the rather quick endorsement of the social 
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scoreboard at the December EPSCO and European Councils. Nevertheless, some of its 
potential supporters (namely the ETUC, the ‘Social Platform’, and the ‘European anti-poverty 
network’)  did not hesitate to criticize its lack of ambition despite their overall positive 
attitude towards the initiative.79 Perhaps more significantly, the European Parliament also 
criticized the non-binding nature of the social indicators in a Resolution adopted on 25 
February 2014. 80 In spite of these criticisms, one may think that a strategic alliance with the 
EPSCO committees had more relevance to DG EMPL. As a matter of fact, the social 
scoreboard was swiftly endorsed at the December Council and was then considered as an 
integral component of the European semester 2013-2014.  
Moreover, in working together with the EMCO and the SPC, DG EMPL also ensured 
its capacity to provide robust indicators, thus defusing potential criticisms. Vanhercke has 
already studied how the EMCO, the SPC and DG EMPL have improved their own analytical 
toolbox over the last few years so as to acquire a place at the table of the economic 
governance.81 It has also been demonstrated that these three actors were acting in a more and 
more cooperative manner. Similarly, with respect to the social scoreboard, it can be argued 
that these actors have relied on each other’s analytical instruments to improve their own 
position in the European semester. On the one hand, DG EMPL explained in the 
Communication that the interpretation of its scoreboard should build on the tools already 
developed by the EMCO (Employment Performance Monitor) and the SPC (Social Protection 
Performance Monitor) as well as on the Joint Assessment Framework, which is the joint 
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responsibility of the Commission and of both committees mentioned above. And on the other 
hand, the EMCO and the SPC have taken the advantage of the opportunity to raise the 
visibility of their own instruments thanks to the new social scoreboard. 82  
Therefore, one could argue that DG EMPL has sought the support from the 
EMCO and the SPC as a way to reinforce its credibility, namely by convincing 
competing policy-makers of its sufficient analytical capacity, and by reassuring 
the Member States that its authority to build the indicators of the social 
scoreboard basically derived from its constant dialogue with the Council 
committees. This seems to support my second hypothesis as regards capacity-
building.  
Now that a thorough analysis of the agenda-setting process of the social dimension of 
the EMU has been provided, we can move on to the last section of my analysis. In the next 
section, I intend to briefly assess to what extent this social dimension, as it appeared at the end 
of this agenda-setting process, has been taken into account in the European semester 2013-
2014.  
2.5 Is the social dimension of the EMU only window-dressing?  
As explained above, two new social scoreboards have been developed as a means to 
enhance the surveillance of social and employment challenges in the Member States. The first 
scoreboard of five headline indicators is meant to be included in the JER annexed to the AGS. 
The second scoreboard consisting of four auxiliary indicators is now part of the MIP and 
complements its battery of macroeconomic indicators. We should thus expect to see the 
second scoreboard in the Alert Mechanism Report (AMR) as well as in the In-Depth Reviews, 
while the first scoreboard should be discussed in the Joint Employment Report which should 
itself feed into the economic priorities underlined in the Annual Growth Survey (AGS). I will 
critically evaluate how these two scoreboards have been used, on the one hand, in the JER and 
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the AGS and, on the other hand, in the AMR and the IDR.83 This will allow me to complete 
the analysis provided in the previous sections by examining what the outcome of the agenda-
setting process was in terms of the social rebalancing of the European semester.  
The social scoreboard in the JER and the AGS 2014 
For starters, one can observe that the JER 2014, adopted at the March European 
Council, devotes a special section of its analysis to the social scoreboard proposed by the 
Commission. It is worth noting that the analysis based on this scoreboard only comes second 
in the JER, arguably meaning that it should be used as a complement to the conventional 
analysis. Moreover, it is interesting to stress that the JER recalls the necessity for the reader to 
interpret the social scoreboard in the light of the other analytical instruments of the EPSCO 
coalition, namely the EPM and the SPPM. Surely, this shows once again the importance for 
DG EMPL to rely on its partners’ capacity to enhance its own credibility. In addition, the 
Report suggests that the main interest of such a scoreboard lies in its greater visibility and 
ease of reading.84 The table summing up the results for each indicator of the scoreboard drawn 
at the end of the report indeed provides highly condensed information on the major social and 
employment trends in the EU. Even though the absence of thresholds and colours makes this 
table less readable than it could have been, the inclusion of the ‘distance from the EU 
average’ as well as the ‘annual change’ tends to catch the eye on the main social and 
employment problems affecting the Member States.  
Furthermore, indications are given to help the reader interpret the table and identify 
potentially worrying employment and social developments, namely the existing employment 
and social disparities and the dynamics of socio-economic divergence within the EU and the 
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euro zone.85 This could be seen as an attempt from the EPSCO coalition to circumvent the 
absence of thresholds in the scoreboard and to strategically frame the issue to their advantage.  
In the section on the social scoreboard, it is indeed noteworthy that a great deal is 
made about the potential spill over effects of employment and social problems from one 
Member State on the others. This actually amounts to acknowledge the existence of social 
imbalances in the EU and the eurozone, without, however, explicitly saying so. In so doing, 
the EPSCO coalition arguably sought to put their social scoreboard on equal footing with the 
MIP scoreboard.  
Pursuing the investigation of the place of the social scoreboard in the European 
semester, it should be first noted that no mention is made of it in the AGS 2014.86 Actually, as 
in every AGS since the European semester 2011-2012, one section is devoted to the analysis 
of the social consequences of the crisis. Hence, social issues have never been totally 
overlooked in the AGS. For instance, the AGS 2014 stresses the increasing share of people at 
risk of poverty and the growing risk of exclusion from the labour market.  
However, there are several key points which we should emphasize. First, the priorities 
for action with regard to employment and social policy are virtually the same since the 
European semester 2011-2012: promoting active labour market policies; ensuring that wage 
developments are in line with productivity; and improving the effectiveness of social 
protection systems. Second, the most innovative indicators of the new social scoreboard are 
left out in the AGS, namely the indicator ‘Change in Real gross disposable income of 
households’ (GHDI) and ‘Inequality’. As regards the former, its absence can probably be 
explained by the fact that DG ECFIN has never felt comfortable with it and had only accepted 
to include it in the social scoreboard in return for the deletion of a footnote referring to the 
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future establishment of thresholds.87 Finally, perhaps more interestingly, the policy frame 
developed by the EPSCO coalition in the JER with respect to social imbalances in the EU is 
also conspicuously absent in the AGS. The overall policy frame underlined in the AGS 
remains that of the competitiveness and of the fiscal austerity. This is very significant insofar 
as the AGS is the central document of the European semester which lays the foundations for 
the further process. In other words, while the JER gives an important place to the social 
scoreboard proposed by the Commission, the AGS is much less groundbreaking in this 
respect. Generally speaking, as compared to past years, the policy frame put forward therein is 
remained substantially the same.  
Consequently, the European Council of March, which was meant to endorse the AGS 
and the JER, did not say anything about the newly developed social dimension and simply 
agreed with the same broad priorities as in the past.88 Using Sabatier’s theoretical tools, this 
amounts to saying that the ECFIN policy core is still dominant in the policy subsystem.  
The social scoreboard in the MIP 2014 
First of all, it is striking to observe that, for the first time since the crisis, the Alert 
Mechanism Report 2014 mentions the deterioration of the social situation in most EU 
Member States and, perhaps more importantly, the strong divergences in poverty and 
unemployment across the EU.89 This could suggest that the policy frame developed by the 
EPSCO coalition according to which social imbalances are just as important as 
macroeconomic imbalances has been somewhat ‘internalized’ by the opposite coalition. 
Second, the AMR indicates that the new social scoreboard of four auxiliary indicators has 
been used to interpret the conventional MIP scoreboard. This is mirrored by the specific bullet 
point addressing the employment and social situation in several Member States in the second 
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section on the ‘Progress in the Correction of Imbalances’. In this section, the AMR 
surprisingly notes that:  
“[…] increase rates of long-term and youth unemployment, inactivity, poverty 
and social exclusion denote an underutilisation of resources and deterioration 
in social cohesion.”90 
Not only does the AMR deal with issues such as poverty, youth unemployment and 
social exclusion but it even seems to be concerned with the social cohesion in the Member 
States. This is completely new when compared to the previous AMRs.  
Third, further confirmation of this new ‘social sensitivity’ can be seen in the country-
specific commentaries. For eleven countries out of the twenty-four concerned by these 
commentaries, the AMR points the finger at worrying levels of youth unemployment, long-
term unemployment or even poverty. Even though these social considerations are relegated to 
the bottom of the list of potential imbalances, they are worthy of note. That being said, when 
macroeconomic imbalances are defined at the end of the report,91 no mention is made of any 
of the auxiliary indicators included in the social scoreboard. Arguably, this could mean that 
when identifying risks of potential imbalances in the Member States, DG ECFIN’s services 
will not pay too much attention to the new social scoreboard developed by DG EMPL, thus 
perhaps reducing it to a window dressing exercise.  
The analysis of the In-Depth Reviews reveals a somewhat different picture. On several 
accounts, the IDRs are illustrative of the overall little place given to the social scoreboard in 
the MIP. To begin with, only six countries92 out of the eleven in which social issues had been 
put to the fore in the AMR were subject to an IDR from the Commission, thereby implicitly 
acknowledging that these issues were not a sufficient reason to justify a reinforced 
surveillance. When more deeply analyzing the IDRs for each of these six countries, we can 
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observe, though, that social issues are not left aside. Except for Ireland,93 a more or less 
developed analysis is provided for each of the auxiliary indicators included in the social 
scoreboard. However, most of the time (in 4 of the 6 countries) this analysis is only developed 
in the section ‘Macroeconomic developments’, whereas the section ‘Imbalances and risks’ is 
mainly concerned with conventional MIP indicators. In this latter section, when it comes to 
examine social developments, the focus remains on unemployment and labour market 
policies. Hence, poverty issues appear to be sidelined, and when mentioned, these are 
invariably related to the inefficiencies of labour market policies and of social protection 
schemes in the Member States. In light of the absence of poverty concerns in the 
Communication from the Commission summing up the results of the IDR 2014, this 
observation seems to be confirmed for the whole MIP procedure.  
To summarize this last subsection, we have seen that, even though both procedures 
(AGS and MIP) take due account of the social consequences of the crisis, a fundamental 
paradigm shift has not taken place as a result of the new social scoreboards. Except for the 
JER that stands out by its emphasis on social imbalances, the predominant ‘social’ concern 
expressed in the other documents remains that of the unemployment, while the reference to 
other social issues appears to be used as a kind of social ‘coating’ without much affecting the 
actual content of the recommendations made by the Commission to the Member States. Once 
again, it appears that the dominant policy core of the policy subsystem is that of the ECFIN 
coalition. Consequently, my last hypothesis seems to be invalidated.  
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Conclusion 
As a conclusion, it is worth recalling the key lessons learnt in this paper. At the end of the first 
part, I had elaborated three hypotheses related to the issue career, the agenda-setting strategies 
and the policy subsystem of the EMU governance. Concerning the first hypothesis, we have 
seen that far from having taken a unique road, the issue of the social dimension of the EMU 
has started its career ‘from below’ in the EP Committee for Employment and Social Affairs, 
was then gradually discussed by stakeholders and DG EMPL, and finally ended up at the level 
of the European Council which was, in confirmation of my first hypothesis, the only 
institution able to initiate this very sensitive issue..  
The issue was then expanded to the Commission, where competing DGs have been 
striving to shape the proposal so as to translate their assumed beliefs into it and to improve 
upon or maintain their position in the European semester. Once specified, the issue ultimately 
went back to the Council for endorsement. These observations serve as a reminder of the 
ideal-typical nature of the ‘issue-career’ model used in this working paper. Moreover, when 
considering the whole agenda-setting process, there is strong evidence that the issue of the 
social dimension of the EMU has faced numerous blockades, particularly before it was 
initiated by the European Council and during the policy shaping phase in the Commission. 
My first hypothesis seems thus to be fully confirmed.   
As far as agenda-setting strategies are concerned, my analysis has offered 
corroborating evidence for my second hypothesis. One the one hand, we have clearly seen 
that agenda-setters have been constantly trying to affect policy frames in order to arouse 
interest and to claim authority, using both the “big words” and the “small steps” strategies. On 
the other hand, I have demonstrated that agenda-setters have sought out to influence the venue 
in which that issue was treated in order to mobilize their coalition and to convince of their 
capacity to deal with it. The hypotheses that were elaborated in accordance with Princen’s 
theoretical framework thus appear to be confirmed.  
Finally, with respect to my third hypothesis, it appears from the last section of this 
working paper that, despite the entrance of the social dimension of the EMU on the formal 
agenda, no social rebalancing of the European semester has taken place so far. Table 2 
summarizes the results of my analysis. 
Table 2 Summary of the results of the analysis 
Issue career (H1) As a ‘high politics’ issue, the social dimension of the EMU 
has been initiated ‘from above’. It was then expanded to lower 
levels of decision-making. Throughout its career, this issue has 
faced both vertical and horizontal ‘blockades’.  
Confirmed 
Agenda-
setting 
strategies 
(H2) Agenda-setters have strategically framed this issue in order 
to arouse interest and claim authority, and directed it towards 
their coalition’s venue so as to mobilize their supporters and 
convince of their capacity to deal with it.  
Confirmed 
Agenda-
setting 
outcome 
(H3) The policy core of the new economic governance of the 
EMU has changed as a result of the agenda-setting process of this 
issue.  
Refuted 
 
Beyond these hypotheses, I have also found some support for the assumption that this 
policy subsystem was characterized by a turf battle between two opposing coalitions. I have 
indeed demonstrated that at least DG EMPL, the SPC and the EMCO were supporting each 
other in order to acquire a greater say in the new economic governance. However, probably 
for tactical reasons, neither the EP nor “social” stakeholders seem to have been included in 
this presumed coalition. Nevertheless, more research is needed to investigate if these actors 
really meet the criteria for a genuine advocacy coalition and if the same pattern may be found 
with respect to the ECFIN coalition. 
Moreover, further research is required to more fully understand the gradual attention 
drawn to this issue as well as the incremental buildup of support from the higher level 
decision makers. Other interviews within the dominant coalition would certainly have allowed 
an even more detailed analysis of the strategies used to keep the issue off the agenda. In 
addition, it would be worth exploring how the two social scoreboards have impacted the CSRs 
that have been published at the end of the European semester 2014. Arguably, one may think 
that these CSRs will still reflect the dominant policy core of the policy subsystem. However, 
it may well be that this policy subsystem will be ultimately affected by the European elections 
and the subsequent ‘new’ Commission. It is also possible that this policy core will come to be 
progressively challenged by the resistances of the Member States, on the one side warned not 
to exceed their budgetary objectives and on the other called upon to reach the Europe 2020 
targets. Domestic resistances from citizens as well as appeals from the European organized 
civil society could also well encourage a change of course of the new economic governance.  
As far as I am concerned, a real shift in the mindset of the dominant ECFIN coalition 
is essential if one wants to maintain a decent level of popular support for the European 
project. That is not to say that developing a social dimension is only a matter of legitimacy 
and appearance. Taking seriously into account poverty, youth unemployment or inequalities is 
also an economic necessity insofar as tackling those problems today amounts to invest in the 
human capital which will be crucial for our growth prospects tomorrow. As I have 
demonstrated throughout this paper, the new economic governance is a maturing process 
which might very well evolve in that direction. But for this to happen, agenda-setters will 
need to keep the notion of the social dimension alive and continue their struggle to make it a 
reality.  
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Europe is in a constant state of flux. European politics, economics, law and indeed European 
societies are changing rapidly. The European Union itself is in a continuous situation of 
adaptation. New challenges and new requirements arise continually, both internally and 
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areas of political science, law or economics, but much of it is of an interdisciplinary nature. 
The objective is to promote understanding of the issues concerned and to make a contribution 
to ongoing discussions. 
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